5 this region plays a central role in contextually-dependent moral judgment (e.g., Zahn et al., 2011) .
Therefore the OFC has an important role in moral cognition (for reviews see: Moll et al., 2005 , Blair et al., 2006 , Sobhani and Bechara, 2011 , Pascual et al., 2013 .
Meta-analysis on the OFC have routinely shown that the lateral region of the OFC is related to the evaluation of punishers and may lead to a change in behaviour, whereas the medial region is typically related to monitoring the reward value of reinforcers Rolls, 2004, Berridge and Kringelbach, 2013) . Severe damage to the OFC can lead to an increase in immoral behaviour (Eslinger and Damasio, 1985 , Saver and Damasio, 1991 , Sobhani and Bechara, 2011 and individuals scoring high on psychopathy often have anatomical and functional dysfunctions in this area (Best et al., 2002 , Antonucci et al., 2006 , Anderson and Kiehl, 2012 , Molenberghs et al., 2014b .
Very little is known about social situations in which people are directly responsible for harming others. Previous work has reported differences in activation patterns as well as functional connectivity modulated by whether an observed action is harmful (Decety & 6 activation was found in regions typically associated with receiving rewards such as the striatum and medial OFC. These areas became more active when people were rewarding ingroup versus outgroup members. In contrast, punishing others led to increased activation in regions typically associated with Theory of Mind including the mPFC and posterior superior temporal sulcus (pSTS), as well as regions typically associated with moral sensitivity such as the lateral OFC (Molenberghs et al., 2014b) . Importantly, these areas were equally active when harming ingroup versus outgroup members. This suggests that, at least in situations where there is no strong animosity between groups (i.e., students from neighbouring universities), ingroup bias is more evident in favouring the ingroup than in harming the outgroup (Brewer, 1999) .
However, group membership extends beyond just ingroup-outgroup comparisons. For example, during war the group membership of the victim (e.g., civilian versus soldier) should play an important role when deciding to harm the person or not. If the violence against someone is seen as justified (i.e., killing an enemy soldier when under attack) versus unjustified (i.e., killing an innocent civilian), we should feel less guilt and this should lead to a difference in neuronal activation in areas typically associated with moral sensitivity. Moral sensitivity is defined here as the quick detection of a moral situation, which typically happens prior to complex moral reasoning (Haidt, 2001 , Robertson et al., 2007 , Molenberghs et al., 2014a ). This process is specifically relevant in our study where people are exposed to moral and immoral situations in a highly dynamic environment. Moral sensitivity as such is the first stage of ethical decision, which according to the social intuitionist model (Haidt, 2001) , is associated with an instant feeling of approval or disapproval when we witness a morally laden action.
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Previous fMRI research has shown that an increase in moral sensitivity when watching others being harmed is associated with increased activation in lateral OFC Molenberghs et al., 2014a) . More complex moral reasoning, on the other hand, is typically associated with Theory of Mind regions such as the mPFC, posterior STS and adjacent TPJ (Young and Dungan, 2012) . But what about situations where the individual is directly responsible for causing harm? A sense of agency is a major dimension of the moral experience (Berthoz et al., 2006 , Decety & Porges, 2011 Moll et al., 2007) . In particular, actively causing harm may lead to more moral emotions such as guilt, which is the feeling we experience when we feel personally responsible for the misfortune caused to others (Moll et al., 2007 , Kédia et al., 2008 . Understanding the link between harm-doing and guilt is of critical importance because it provides unique insights into why ordinary people are able to commit harmful actions in specific situations.
The aim of this study was to identify the different neural mechanisms involved in being responsible for harming others in justified and unjustified situations. To investigate this, we conducted an fMRI study in which participants imagined being the perpetrator while watching animated video clips (see Experimental Procedures for details) from a first-person 8 predicted that participants would feel less guilt when imagining shooting soldiers compared to civilians. We also predicted, when imagining shooting soldiers (as compared to imagining shooting civilians), participants would show less activation in areas typically associated with directly harming others and moral sensitivity, such as the lateral OFC (Molenberghs et al., 2014b) , given that these actions are typically seen as more justified.
Methods

Participants
Forty-eight participants (24 males) participated in the fMRI experiment (age range: 18-51 years; M = 22.5, SD = 5.3 years). All participants had normal or corrected-to-normal vision and were tested for MRI safety. All participants signed written informed consent upon arrival and were reimbursed $30 AUD on completion of their participation. The study was approved by the Behavioural & Social Sciences Ethical Review Committee of the University of Queensland.
Materials and procedure
Participants were informed that they would be watching first-person perspective video game clips in which a soldier, civilian or nobody would get shot. Having participants imagine being the actor while watching pre-recorded scenes allowed us to better control differences in duration and visual characteristics between conditions, compared to previous fMRI studies in which participants played the games themselves (King et al., 2006 , Mathiak and Weber, 2006 , Mathiak et al., 2011 , Klasen et al., 2012 . The video clips were matched between the three conditions (Soldiers, Civilians and Control) on several visual characteristics such as the amount of movement, brightness and clarity (see Pilot Experiment in Supplementary material for details). Participants were instructed to imagine themselves as the person performing the action so that their mental simulation of the situation could be used to elicit neural activity that closely parallels the actual situation (Decety and Porges, 2011) . The video clips in the three conditions were presented in blocks in which three videos from the same condition were presented sequentially (Figure 1) , followed by the question, 'Who did you shoot?' Participants responded by using a three button response pad corresponding to the answers, (1) Soldiers, (2) Civilians and (3) Nobody. These responses were counterbalanced in their order of appearance across participants. Participants were given a practice run of the experiment on a laptop using E-prime2 (http://www.pstnet.com/eprime.cfm), to ensure they understood what was involved in the task.
The fMRI experiment consisted of five repeated functional runs (5 minutes each) with a structural scan (5 minutes), which was conducted between the third and fourth run. At the beginning of each run, participants were presented with the instructions as a reminder. A white fixation dot was then presented on a black screen for 5 seconds. Each functional run had 12 blocks. During each block, 3 videos of one condition were presented on a random basis from a list of 18 videos for each of the three conditions. Presenting three videos in sequence from the same condition was used to analyse the fMRI data in a block design, which was chosen as it offers superior statistical power over an event-related design (Aguirre and D'Esposito, 1998) . The first two videos in one block were followed by a 1 second delay.
The third video was followed by a 5 second response ('Who did you shoot?') window during which reaction and accuracy was recorded. Each block lasted 25 seconds ( Figure 1 ) and each condition was presented 4 times, making up the 12 blocks per run (presented in random sequence), ending with a 10 second delay. This was repeated for each of the 5 runs.
A 3-Tesla Siemens MRI scanner with 32-channel head volume coil was used to obtain the data. Functional images were acquired with the gradient echo planar imaging (EPI) with the following parameters: repetition time (TR) of 2.5 seconds, echo time (TE) of 36 ms, flip angle (FA) of 90˚. Thirty-six transversal slices with 64 x 64 voxels at 3mm 2 in-plane resolution and a 10% gap in between the slices covered the whole brain. Whole brain images were generated every 2.5 seconds and 166 images were acquired during each functional run.
The first two images from each functional run were removed to allow for steady-state tissue magnetization. A three dimensional high resolution T1-weighted whole brain structural image was acquired after the third run for anatomical reference (TR = 1900, TE = 2.32 ms, FA = 9˚, 192 cube matrix, voxel size = 0.9 cubic mm, slice thickness = 0.9 mm).
fMRI analyses
SPM8 software (http://www.fil.ion.ucl.ac.uk/spm/) run through Matlab (http://www.mathworks.com.au/products/matlab/) was used to analyse the data. To counter any head-movements all the EPI images were realigned to the first scan of each run and a mean image was created. The anatomical image was then co-registered to this mean functional image. To correct for variation in brain size and anatomy between participants, each structural scan was normalized to the MNI T1 standard template (Montreal Neuropsychological Institute) with a voxel size of 1x1x1 mm using the segmentation procedure. The same segmentation parameters were then also used to normalize all the EPI images to the T1 template with a voxel size of 3x3x3 mm. This process mathematically transformed each participant's brain image to match the template so that any chosen brain region should refer to the same region across all participants. Before further analysis, all images were smoothed with an isotropic Gaussian kernel of 9mm.
As part of the first level of analysis, a general linear model was created for each participant.
For each participant in each of the three conditions (i.e., Soldiers, Civilians and Control), regions with significant Blood Oxygen Level Dependent (BOLD) changes in each voxel were identified using a block design with a duration of 20 seconds (which corresponds to the presentation of the three videos without the 5 second response) and onsets aligned to the start of each condition.
In the second level of analysis contrast images for each condition across all participants were included in a factorial design. First an ANOVA was conducted to identify clusters that were differentially activated between the three conditions (cluster-wise familywise error rate (FWE) of p <.05; corrected for multiple comparisons for the whole brain with clusters thresholded at p < 0.001). These significant regions combined, were then used as a mask for subsequent pairwise analyses between the conditions.
To specifically examine the differences between justified and unjustified violence, the contrast Civilians minus Soldiers and its reverse contrast Soldiers minus Civilians were created. These two contrasts isolated the unique activation associated with justified and unjustified violence. The contrasts Civilians minus Control and Soldiers minus Control were also created to compare the shooting conditions to a baseline control condition. Results from the ANOVA and the latter two contrasts are presented in Supplementary material ( Figure S1 and Table S1 ) and interpreted only when further clarification is required, as they were not central to the research question. All pairwise analyses were corrected for multiple comparisons for the size of the mask, using a voxel-level familywise error rate (FWE) of p 12
Guilt
To determine if our manipulation was effective, we asked participants right after the fMRI experiment to indicate on a 7-point scale (1 = strongly agree to 7 = strongly disagree) how guilty they felt about shooting the soldiers and civilians, respectively: 'I felt guilty about shooting the soldiers/civilians'. Items on the two items were reverse scored so that higher levels indicated 'more guilt'.
PPI analysis
Two effective connectivity analyses using psychophysiological interaction (PPI) were PPI analyses were carried out for each subject involving the creation of a design matrix with the interaction term, the psychological factor, and the physiological factor as regressors.
Subject-specific contrast images were then entered into two random-effects group analyses.
PPI analyses was then conducted in order to identify if any brain areas showed a significant increase in functional coupling with left and right OFC during Civilians relative to Soldiers.
Significant activity for the PPI analyses was defined by a cluster-wise familywise error rate (FWE) of p <.05; corrected for multiple comparisons for the whole brain with clusters thresholded at p < 0.001. Figure 2A ). To further explore if the difference in activation in bilateral OFC was influenced by feelings of relative guilt between Civilians versus Soldiers, the mean % signal change for all voxels in this bilateral region was extracted for these two conditions. A bivariate Pearson correlation revealed that the more guilty participants felt about shooting civilians versus soldiers, the higher the % signal change difference was between the two conditions, r(46) = .30, p = .04 (Figure 3 ).
Results
Behavioral results ('
Soldiers minus Civilians. When imagining shooting soldiers relative to shooting
civilians, significantly more activation was found in the precuneus and lingual gyrus (Table   1 , Figure 2B ). 
PPI analysis
Discussion
As expected, participants experienced less guilt when imagining shooting soldiers compared to imagining shooting civilians. Interestingly, mentally simulating the killing of civilians led to increased activation in the lateral OFC, while killing soldiers did not ( Figure 2A , Table 1 ; also see Table S1 and Figure S1 ). In addition, the more guilt participants felt about shooting civilians versus soldiers, the greater the activation in the lateral OFC (Figure 3 ). These results
show that being responsible for justified or unjustified violence against others leads to differential feelings of guilt, and that activation in the lateral OFC is directly related with this experience.
Agency is an important factor in the subjective experience of responsibility and previous neuroimaging research has shown that the lateral OFC is an important area when agency is involved in aversive, morally sensitive situations (Decety & Porges, 2011; Moll et al., 2007) .
Meta-analysis on fMRI studies have consistently associated the lateral OFC with the evaluation of punishers which may lead to a change in ongoing behaviour, whereas the medial OFC is typically related to monitoring the reward value of reinforcers Rolls, 2004, Berridge and Kringelbach, 2013) . This suggests that the OFC plays an important role in linking certain behaviours and stimuli with either positive (medial OFC) or negative (lateral OFC) value.
A similar distinction in OFC was recently found in a recent fMRI study, in which participants either had to reward other people, which led to increased activation in medial OFC, or punish other people, which led to increased activation in lateral OFC (Molenberghs et al., 2014b) . In this study no overall difference in lateral OFC activation was found when harming members of participants' own university versus a rival university (Molenberghs et al., 2014b) .
However, this might not be surprising given that there was no strong animosity between the two groups. Here in a more extreme situation, the group membership of the victim (i.e., enemy soldier versus innocent civilian) did have a significant effect on the neural responses associated with intentionally harming others.
The distinctive role of medial and lateral OFC in morality fits well with the model by JanoffBulman and colleagues (2009) who describe two types of morality. Prescriptive morality is focused on rewards, such as praise and pride and therefore initiates actions. On the other hand, proscriptive morality is focused on punishments, such as blame and guilt which in turn inhibits actions (i.e., killing civilians is punished through increased activation in lateral OFC).
This is in line with our results, which showed that participants felt guiltier when imagining shooting civilians compared to soldiers and the more guilt they felt, the more activation was found in lateral OFC. The lack of activation in bilateral lateral OFC for shooting soldiers, suggest that the normal associations implicated with harming another human being are not being activated when the target is a soldier. We do not imply that the reduced activation of the lateral OFC for killing soldiers is an active process in which this region is "actively" inhibited in this condition. Rather we suggest that because the action is seen as justified, there is no need to associate the action with negative reinforcement (i.e., through increased activation the lateral OFC).
It should be noted however that this is just one interpretation of the OFC results. An alternative view would be that people were less inclined to take the perspective from a person who is shooting an innocent civilian compared to a person shooting a soldier. Because the OFC is often activated when people inhibit an aversive or painful sensation (Hooker and Knight, 2006) , less activation in this region for the Soldiers condition could be a result of the reduced effort to regulate a person's emotions in this condition. Regardless of the interpretation, our results clearly show a differential role of the lateral OFC in justified and unjustified violence.
Lateral OFC also showed increased connectivity with bilateral TPJ, for the civilians minus soldiers contrast. This suggests that the increase in OFC activity for unjustified violence is subserved by increased coupling with the TPJ. Previous research has found that the TPJ is often involved in lower-level processes associated with the sense of agency and reorienting attention to salient stimuli, as well as higher-level cognitive processing tasks involved in social cognitions, such as empathy, morality and Theory of Mind (Decety & Lamm, 2007;  intentions made by the participant (Young et al., 2007; Young & Saxe, 2009) . Disruption of the TPJ by transcranial magnetic stimulation (TMS) also causes participants to judge attempted harms as less morally forbidden and more morally permissible (Young et al., 2010) . This suggests that the TPJ plays an important role in moral behaviour and our results further show that increased connectivity between OFC and TPJ is an important aspect in highlighting immoral behaviour (i.e., killing an innocent civilian).
Finally, imagining shooting civilians compared to soldiers also increased activation in fusiform gyrus, while the opposite contrast increased activation in the precuneus and lingual gyrus. This difference in activation in these visual areas was unexpected given that the video clips were matched on several visual characteristics in our pilot experiment (see Supplementary material for details). The fusiform gyrus, although not specific for faces per se but rather visual expertise in general (Gauthier et al., 1999 , Gauthier et al., 2000 , Xu, 2005 , is typically associated with face processing (Kanwisher et al., 1997) and specifically facial expressions (Ganel et al., 2005) . These results thus may suggest that participants were more focused on the faces of the civilians, when killing them. The precuneus on the other hand was more activated when imagining shooting soldiers and this area is typically activated during shifting spatial attention (Molenberghs et al., 2007) . This result might explain the increased activation in the early visual cortex (i.e., lingual gyrus), suggesting that participants were more focused on the movement of the soldiers and were refocussing their attention in order to accurately shoot them.
The present research is not without limitations and we readily acknowledge that imagining harming others during video games is not the same as real life situations. However, considering the limitations of the MRI environment and the need to control visual features between conditions, we believe our paradigm was optimal. Imagining being the agent who is acting in a harmful manner has been used successfully in the past to elicit neural responses involved in morality (Decety and Porges, 2011) and we found similar areas (i.e., lateral OFC) being activated as in our previous fMRI study when people believed they were actually hurting (i.e., giving electroshocks) others directly (Molenberghs et al., 2014b) . In addition, the use of video games allowed us to control the visual features of the stimuli (see Supplementary material for details).
To conclude, imagining unjustified killings (i.e., civilians) resulted in higher levels of guilt, as well as increased activations in lateral OFC compared to justified killings. The data suggest that certain situations in which violence is seen as justified can lead to less activation of the typical brain responses associated with harming another human being. As such, these results have important implications for a better understanding of how ordinary people can override constraints to violent action against particular people in specific situations. 
